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FOREWORD
For years, the Israel-Turkey partnership was believed to be an anchor of stability in the troubled
Middle East. For the United States the two regional
players were supposed to pave the way to a regional
system, but the collapse of their bilateral relation over
the last years has put an end to these expectations. As a
result of this crisis between Ankara and Jerusalem, the
competition in the East Mediterranean region evolved
significantly. Whereas Turkey increased its inflammatory rhetoric against Israel, the latter counterbalanced
Turkey‘s position by strengthening ties with two
rivals of Ankara: Greece and Cyprus.
As Jean-Loup Samaan explains in this Letort Paper, these power plays have major ramifications. The
perilous zero-sum game which is taking place in the
Mediterranean impacts bilateral relations between all
the stakeholders, not only at the military but at the
economic level as well. It also jeopardizes the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) policies in the
region, whether inside the alliance with Greece and
Turkey, or through its partnership with Israel.
But more importantly, all these countries are U.S.
allies and their disputes put the American government in a delicate position, trying not to antagonize
any of its partners while assuring each of them of its
solidarity. Defining U.S. long-term foreign and defense policy in the Mediterranean will therefore demand a precise appraisal of the evolving power plays
in an area which remains a critical region for American national security interests. Based on in-depth
research and interviews conducted in the region,
Jean-Loup Samaan’s monograph provides us with an
up-to-date evaluation of the geopolitics of the East
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Mediterranean which will be beneficial not only for
scholars but also for the U.S. defense community.
For this reason, the Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph on the East
Mediterranean Triangle and the manner in which it can
impact U.S. national security interests.
		
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The alliance system in the Eastern Mediterranean
Sea has significantly evolved over the last years. The
rift between Israel and Turkey since 2009 led to new
strategic developments. In particular, Israeli-Greek
ties have grown in earnest. Authorities in Israel and
Greece have signed various trade as well as security
cooperation agreements. Furthermore, the discovery
of natural gas reserves in the southeastern Mediterranean has prompted cooperation between Israel,
Cyprus, and Greece.
This Israel-Greece-Cyprus initiative has logically
triggered strong opposition from Turkey, which does
not recognize the government in Nicosia and objects
to the claims of the Greek Cypriot Administration
over the gas reserves in the south of the island. Ankara responded by conducting air and sea military drills
close to the area of the planned project, and Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu threatened that Turkey
would take appropriate measures if the three countries were to go on with the project.
As a result, the East Mediterranean Triangle can
now be characterized as a volatile regional system in
which alliances are no longer stable blocs. This is reflected in the ambivalent games played by the three
main actors. Each of them is trying to seek seemingly
contradictory goals: Israel wants to restore its ties with
Turkey while hedging against Ankara’s policies via a
rapprochement with Greece; Greece aims to strengthen
its military and commercial relations with Israel, but
without openly defying Turkey; Turkey still benefits
from Israeli military know-how but expresses strong
condemnations of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, and moreover, it dismisses the
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Israeli-Greek rapprochement while it uses its Navy in
the Mediterranean area as a means of coercive diplomacy against competing forces. All of this generates
an odd zero-sum game: every stakeholder claims the
rules of this game still apply but bypasses them.
Moreover, the competition affects the security arrangements in Europe, with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Middle East partnership being
in a deadlock. The natural gas projects brought about
disputes over the territorial claims in the area and in
the coming years, without a diplomatic settlement, it
could lead to rising naval skirmishes with gunboat
diplomacy becoming a norm.
To prevent instability, the United States has to navigate between the concerns and the sensitivity of three
allies. The core issue of the current troubles in the East
Mediterranean Triangle remains the crisis in the Turkish-Israeli relations. As a result, the first measure to
prevent further escalation in this rift is to disconnect
the Turkish-Israeli file from the Greek and Cypriot
cases. U.S. diplomats and officers should carefully
dismiss the counterbalancing narrative behind the Israeli-Greek rapprochement. Following the same logic
of prevention, the U.S. administration may address
the NATO issue by making the case that the Alliance’s
partnership policy should not be undermined by the
tensions between one member nation and a partner
country. It does not mean challenging or ignoring the
Turkish political agenda; otherwise, this would only
bring further obstruction from Ankara. However, the
scope of NATO-Israel partnership is by nature modest and should not be the issue of a fierce diplomatic
fight. A second step would look at the ways to reinitiate political and diplomatic dialogue between Israel
and Turkey. The United States could act as a mediator
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by convening working-level meetings to discuss common areas of interest, such as the Syrian crisis and its
effects on the region. Eventually, this could pave the
way for a return to stability in the East Mediterranean
area.

xii

THE EAST MEDITERRANEAN TRIANGLE
AT CROSSROADS
INTRODUCTION
On May 14, 2015, the Israeli, Greek, and U.S. Navies concluded a 2-week long exercise named Noble
Dina. Officially, this annual trilateral naval exercise is
“designed to increase interoperability by developing
the individual and collective maritime proficiencies
of Greece, Israel, and the U.S., while also promoting
friendship, mutual understanding, and cooperation.”1
The 2015 edition was the fifth and largest one as it
involved hundreds of military personnel of the three
countries and nearly a dozen ships, such as Greek
and Israeli submarines, the U.S. Arleigh Burke-class
guided missile destroyer Laboon (DDG 58), the Military Sealift Command fleet-replenishment oiler USNS
Lenthall (T-AO 189), and P-3C Orion aircraft.2 The scenarios driving the exercise included search and rescue
missions, ship seizure, and port security operations.
It was only 5 years ago that this naval exercise did
not exist, but moreover, the Israeli and the U.S. Navies
were conducting a similar one with Greece’s neighbor and long-time rival, Turkey. Indeed, from 1998 to
2009, Israel, Turkey, and the United States had been
organizing the exercise “Reliant Mermaid.” Following the 1996 agreement between Israel and Turkey for
military cooperation, the two Mediterranean countries
had been strengthening their ties by increasing joint
defense activities. In that perspective, “Reliant Mermaid” served as a means to enhance interoperability
between their navies. Moreover, for Ankara and Jerusalem, “Reliant Mermaid” was conveying a message
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of resolve and deterrence to the surrounding hostile
countries, namely Syria and Iran. However, Turkish
participation in the exercise stopped in 2010 following
the crisis over the Mavi Marmara flotilla that saw the
Israeli navy opening fire on Turkish activists refusing
to comply with the Gaza blockade. Soon, the TurkishIsraeli relation would turn sour, and the Israeli navy
opened discussions with its Greek counterpart to
organize a similar exercise, “Noble Dina.”
The story of this exercise—its timing, its purpose—
is not a mere anecdote. It reflects the swift and major
change in power plays that the East-Mediterranean
region has been experiencing over the last 5 years. As
we will see in this monograph, this shift has ramifications not only in the realm of military cooperation, but
also in domains such as diplomatic negotiations, commercial activities, and energy markets.
Specifically the new dynamics between Greece,
Turkey, and Israel—the members of what we call here
the “East Mediterranean Triangle”—have an impact
on critical issues such as the negotiations over the status of Cyprus. It affects regional organizations like the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) whose
Middle East partnership, the Mediterranean Dialogue,
suffered from the tensions.
But as politics changed so did the business landscape. Israeli tourists to Turkey progressively migrated to Greece as well as arms sales (though Turkey
remains an important client of Israeli defense companies). Moreover, the discovery of natural gas reserves
in the Southeastern Mediterranean has prompted cooperation between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus. Former
Israeli Energy Minister Uzi Landau went as far as to
speak of “an axis of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, and
possibly more countries, which will offer an anchor of
stability.”3
2

This Israel-Greece-Cyprus initiative has logically
triggered strong opposition from Turkey, which does
not recognize the government in Nicosia, and objects
to the claims of the Greek Cypriot Administration
over the gas reserves in the south of the island. Ankara responded by conducting air and sea military drills
close to the area of the planned project, and Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu threatened that Turkey
would take appropriate measures if the three countries were to go on with the project. This has been
denounced by Israel as “gunboat diplomacy.”4
As a result, the strategic triangle in the East Mediterranean has seen its inner logic completely revised.
Understanding these currents and their implications
is the core objective of this monograph. In the following sections, we offer an appraisal of this regional security complex5 that connects the on-going changes
and troubles with the historical developments since
the end of World War II. Indeed, it is a risky endeavor
to describe the contemporary crisis in Israeli-Turkish
relations without looking back at the making of these
relations 60 years ago and their subsequent evolution.
The same could be said of the sudden Greek-Israeli
rapprochement. The historical background helps us
in distinguishing between core issues and temporary
skirmishes, between momentary enthusiasm and
solid partnership.
To investigate our topic, we crossed different types
of sources. The historical section relies mainly on
two types of sources: historical declassified archives
(mostly from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs or
the U.S. government), and personal accounts of policymakers which include essays, correspondence, and
memoirs. In the case of the second and third sections
that cover contemporary issues, we collected informa-
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tion reported by media outlets that provided us with
the backdrop of the current regional landscape. These
data sources were then checked and expanded via interviews with practitioners, journalists, and foreign
policy experts conducted either through a series of
field trips, phone calls, and emails with official representatives. As a general rule, the anonymity of all
sources has been preserved.
In that context, the first section of this monograph
exposes the modern emergence of the East Mediterranean Triangle in the years following World War II
and after the birth of modern Israel in 1948 in particular. The next section focuses on the 2010-2015 period,
during which the initial logic of the triangle unraveled
and engendered a new set of relations between the
three countries. In the third section, we look at three
files affected by the current dynamics of the triangle:
the energy prospects in the Mediterranean, the NATO
partnership policy, and the rise of Israel’s look-east
policy. Finally, we highlight why the future of this
triangle matters for the U.S. defense community vis-àvis the stability in the region and its bilateral relations
with each of the three countries.
THE MODERN EMERGENCE OF THE EAST
MEDITERRANEAN TRIANGLE
To understand the inner logic of the East Mediterranean Triangle composed of Turkey, Greece, and Israel, we need to go back in history to the birth of the
latter. On May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion declared
the establishment of the State of Israel in front of the
Jewish People's Council gathered at the Tel Aviv Museum. Greece and Turkey were not supporters of this
new State in the Mediterranean. Athens had voted
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against the United Nations (UN) Palestine partition
plan in November 1947 and refused to recognize de
jure Israel in 1949. For scholar Amikam Nachmani,
“When the war ended, Greece surpassed even Egypt
in its hostility toward Israel.”6 Eventually consular
relations were established in 1952, but both countries would look at each other with great suspicion.
According to Israeli diplomatic archives, cables sent
from Athens explicitly identified Greece as “an enemy
of Israel.”7
Turkey also voted against the UN partition plan
of 1947, but it would act differently from Greece in
the following years. In March 1949, it became the first
Muslim country to recognize de facto Israel. In March
of the following year, diplomatic relations were established at the level of legation with a Minister Plenipotentiary appointed to Tel Aviv and an Israeli legation
similarly established in Ankara. This step logically
triggered public condemnations of Turkey by Arab
countries invoking the shattered Islamic solidarity
against the Zionist project.8 But at that moment, the
Turkish government of Adnan Menderes, elected in
1950, had different priorities. It aimed not to strengthen Turkish-Arab relations but to integrate the country
into the Western sphere. This succeeded on February 18, 1952, with Turkey becoming a member of the
young North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
(along with Greece that joined the same day). To evidence the new ties with Ankara, the government in
Jerusalem soon aligned itself to the Turkish policy on
Cyprus. This marked the beginning of a strategic triangle in the area: over the coming years the governments of the three countries internalized the security
priorities of the others, and a zero-sum game between
the players became the primary rule.
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Cyprus was to be the litmus test of that zero-sum
game. When in June 1878, the Ottoman Empire had
ceded the island of Cyprus to the United Kingdom to
make it a protectorate, the local population was primarily Orthodox, and the Muslims were a minority.
In 1925, Cyprus formally became a colony of the Commonwealth, and in the following years, the Orthodox
community built a strong national identity under
Greece’s influence. Eventually, they started claiming
the union of Cyprus (enossis) with Greece. But by the
1950s, the strategic environment had dramatically
changed. The Turkish government of Adnan Menderes saw the island as an extension of Anatolia and
opposed the enossis movement. Soon a diplomatic
crisis emerged as Ankara demanded the sustainment
of the current status quo while the Greek government advocated for the union. While Greek Cypriots
intensified their nationalist claims, Turkish Cypriots felt oppressed and both communities engaged in
communitarian fighting.
Although Israel was initially supportive of diplomatic ties with Cyprus, it soon aligned itself with
Ankara’s position. Not only was the Turkish-Israeli
relation a priority, but Cypriot independentists were
receiving arms from Egyptian President Gamal Abdel
Nasser.9 This Israeli position on Cyprus led to a softer
posture of the Turkish delegation at the UN on the
Israeli-Arab dispute.10 As a result, it also deepened the
level of distrust between Israel and Greece.
However, the Suez War of 1956 would lead to a
halt in the steady rapprochement between Ankara and
Jerusalem. On October 29 of that year, Israeli armed
forces attacked the Egyptians and pushed toward
the Suez Canal that had been nationalized 3 months
before. The Israelis were joined 2 days later by the Brit-
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ish and French forces. However, soon this campaign
was condemned by both the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) and the United States with threats
of economic sanctions from Washington addressed to
the three nations. These latter eventually withdrew
(the French and British by December 1956, the Israelis
by March 1957).
The war had a direct impact on Israel-Turkey relations. The pressure from Arab partners was such that
Ankara scaled down its diplomatic mission to Israel
and recalled its Minister, Sevket Istinyeli. On November 26, 1956, a month after Israel invaded Egypt, the
Turkish government issued a statement that it “has
decided to recall its Minister in Tel Aviv, who will not
return until a just and final solution of the Palestine
question has been achieved.”11 Egyptian President
Nasser, who was by then at the peak of his popularity
in the Arab world, was at the forefront of that call on
the Turkish government.
This shift in Turkey’s orientation would prove the
relevance of one fundamental driver of its policy toward Israel: the Arab factor. It would take a year before Ankara resumed its relations with Jerusalem and
that was largely the result of the Turkish calculus visà-vis the developments in the Arab world: first, the increasing ties between neighboring Syria and the USSR,
and second the 1958 coup in Iraq. Along with Turkey
and Pakistan, the Iraqi monarchy had been a member of the Baghdad Pact which aimed at anchoring a
Western-oriented alliance in the region. The coup, led
by Abdul Salam Arif and Abd al-Karim Qasim, took
the White House and the intelligence community by
surprise. They later came to believe that the Egyptian
ruler, Nasser, was behind the revolution.12 With this
regime change in Iraq occurring at the same time as the
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United Arab Republic was being established between
Egypt and Syria, pan-Arabism had gained a momentum in the region that was engendering fear among
the non-Arab countries in the Middle East. Turks and
Israelis both feared that Nasser’s delusions of regional
hegemony would drive his pan-Arabist agenda. In addition, the U.S.-USSR competition also played a significant role as both Turkey and Israel were eager to
be part of the Western side.
In Israel this triggered the making, by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, of a foreign policy strategy, coined
“the alliance of the periphery,” that would seek to
counterbalance Arab foes by strengthening military
ties with non-Arab countries in the Middle East. Along
with the Shah’s Iran and Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia,
Turkey was to become a new primary partner. Only
a few days after the Iraqi crisis, Ben-Gurion wrote to
U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower to detail this
new grand strategy:
With the purpose of erecting a high dam against the
Nasserist-Soviet tidal wave, we have begun tightening our links with several states on the outside of
the perimeter of the Middle East—Iran, Turkey and
Ethiopia....Our goal is to organize a group of countries, not necessarily an official alliance, that will be
able to stand strong against Soviet expansion by proxy
through Nasser, and which might save Lebanon’s
freedom, and maybe in time, Syria’s.13

Contrary to the Baghdad Pact, the alliance of the
periphery was to remain a secret enterprise relying
mostly on military and intelligence exchanges. Additionally, it was from the outset an Israeli strategy
and remained so: it never reached the level of a robust
multilateral, regional alliance, and stayed at the level
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of bilateral relations between Israel and the three other countries. The U.S. government played an instrumental part to support the initiative by encouraging
the decisionmakers in Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia to
join Ben-Gurion’s project. A new step was reached on
August 29, 1958, when Ben-Gurion visited Ankara to
meet his counterpart Adnan Menderes. The content of
their talks still remains a topic of controversy to this
day. Turkish officials downplay the importance of the
event and describe the meeting as a mere recognition
of mutual interests without a binding written statement. However, Sezai Orkunt, head of Turkey’s military intelligence from 1964 to 1968, declared that there
was an agreement concluded but that its content was
made known only to a dozen of civilian and military
policymakers inside the Turkish government.14 These
contradictory views illustrate what soon became the
rule of Israel-Turkey relations: ambiguity, extreme
caution, and, if necessary, opposite statements to preserve the clandestine character of the cooperation. In
1959, the head of the Israeli legation in Turkey even
qualified the relation with Ankara as “love outside
marriage.”15 Likewise, scholar Noa Schonmann refers
to this diplomatic style as a “mistress syndrome” on
the side of Turkey. There has been substantial evidence that trilateral cooperation between Israel, Iran,
and Turkey existed, and involved heads of military intelligence under the auspices of an organization called
Trident.16
In 1960, the new regime of General Cemal Gürsel
replaced Menderes but did not revoke the ties with
Israel. These ties would even get strengthened as it
progressively appeared that in Ankara the most important supporters of the cooperation were the armed
forces. Turkish generals saw the exchange with Israeli
intelligence as extremely valuable for monitoring the
9

developments in Syria, while the possibility to improve the readiness of its soldiers via training events
with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was perceived
beneficial. By 1959, according to Tel Aviv-based
scholar Ofra Bengio, both Israeli and Turkish armies
had worked together on “a joint strategic plan for a
war against Syria (and possibly against another Arab
country).”17 Additionally, the Israeli Air Force was
given permission to train on Turkish territory. Given
the narrowness of Israel’s territory and its absence of
strategic depth, this possibility was crucial.
But soon, Gürsel realized that getting closer to Israel had a major prize. In Iran, Shah Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi announced his public recognition of Israel, a
gesture that led to fierce reactions in the Arab world
and dramatic consequences, such as the deterioration
of Arab-Iranian diplomatic relations. Gürsel was not
keen on antagonizing the Arab rulers, nor was his
successor Ismet Inönü. As a result, political exchanges
remained discreet, if not secret, while economic cooperation—usually perceived as less sensitive—grew in
earnest. While entrepreneurs in both countries were
getting enthusiastic, Turkish politicians remained
cautious and Israeli counterparts became frustrated.
Meanwhile, by 1963, the issue of Cyprus had escalated with open confrontation between the Greek
and Turkish communities. Witnessing the imbalance
between the Greeks and the Turkish minority, Ankara
decided to intervene by bombing Nicosia and threatened a full military intervention. The government
of Inönü believed the West, in particular the United
Kingdom (UK) and the United States, had abandoned
the Turkish community of Cyprus and, as a consequence, Ankara sought for new allies that could help
support its views at the UN general assembly. Eventually, this led Turkey to reconsider its priorities regard10

ing the Arab-Israeli dispute: it needed the diplomatic
leverage that Arab countries could provide on the
Cyprus issue but, to that aim, it had to accommodate
Arab demands on distancing itself from Israel. Furthermore, Israel was also playing a delicate game during the 1964 Cypriot crisis that infuriated the Turkish
officials. Jerusalem did not want to endorse Turkish
bombardment and expressed concerns for the humanitarian disaster on the island. The result was that the
Turkish-Israeli momentum gained after 1958 came to
a halt. Arab-Turkish relations were getting stronger in
terms of trade, diplomatic visits, and media coverage.
Significantly, Turkey, which had not been vocal before on the Palestinian issue, suddenly expressed its
concerns for the refugees.
Still, it is important to underline that the end of the
1958 momentum did not mean a complete dismantlement of Turkish-Israeli relations: intelligence cooperation continued, and Israeli fighter aircraft kept
flying over the Turkish airspace. Ankara refrained
from reaching the point to normalization. It kept the
relations in a cloud of opacity but assessed at the same
time that secret military and intelligence ties were
valuable.
During that period, Israel-Greece relations remained extremely low. In the 70s and 80s, anti-Israeli
rhetoric in the political landscape in Athens was common. For instance, in 1983, Prime Minister Andreas
Papandreou, the socialist leader of Greece, described
the Israeli intervention in Lebanon as “nazi” and “fascist.”18 The Arab factor also played a major role in the
Greek calculus: Athens feared that a rapprochement
with Jerusalem would antagonize Egypt and lead to
economic and physical pressures on the Greek community in the country. Additionally, the shipping
industry in Greece, a key source of the national reve11

nues, relied heavily on the Arab States, thereby making cooperation with Israel detrimental to the whole
economy.
Eventually, Greece established full diplomatic relations with Israel, but that occurred only by 1990. In
the years following the end of the Cold War, Greek-Israeli relations were moving ahead. Turkish leadership was also reassessing its strategy of distancing
itself from Jerusalem. The 1990s were a new period
marked by the optimism borne out of the Oslo Process between the Israelis and the Palestinians. As Jordan signed a peace treaty recognizing the existence
of Israel in 1994, while at the same time pursuing a
negotiation track with Syria, there were high expectations for normalization with the Hebrew State. As a
result, the Turkish equation changed from the one of
the 1960s. Under these conditions, cooperating with
Israel would not antagonize the Arab States. The Oslo
Agreement was signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in September 1993. Only
2 months later, the Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet
Cetin was traveling to Jerusalem. Exchanges between
the two countries would be governed by a Security
and Secrecy Agreement signed on May 31, 1994. However, despite the Oslo mindset in the Middle East, the
agreement indicated the willingness not to share all
the information regarding the extent of the new cooperation. In other words, the opacity of the 1950s was
still the rule.
This first meeting led to full diplomatic relations
and a series of ministerial visits. In October 1994,
again only 9 days after the signing of Jordan-Israel
peace agreements, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller traveled to Israel, which was the first-ever visit to
the country by a Turkish head of government.19
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During this important period when both countries
were discussing strategic cooperation, it is important
to distinguish Turkey’s views on the Israel-Jordan
peace agreements from the Israel-Syria negotiations.
Syria and Turkey were hostile States at that point,
with Syrian ruler Hafez al-Assad harboring the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), which was considered a terrorist organization by Ankara. If the Oslo Process and
Jordan’s recognition of Israel were seen as factors easing the cooperation with Israel, the negotiations with
Syria were considered with more suspicion by the
Turks. In that perspective, the rapprochement with
Israel was understood more as an insurance policy
or a counterbalance measure vis-à-vis Syria. Adding
to the complexity of the triangle, Assad’s Syria was
in urgent need for new allies after the collapse of the
USSR, and it had been turning to countries that were
antagonists of Turkey: Greece and Armenia.
In February 1996, a strategic agreement was signed
between Ankara and Jerusalem: diplomatic relations
were by then at full pace, as military cooperation intensified and bilateral trade bloomed. It is noteworthy
that in both countries the driving forces behind the
agreement were not the ministries of foreign affairs
but the armed forces. As explained by one Israeli retired defense official interviewed, it was the ministry
of defense in Tel Aviv that initiated the talks with
Ankara without requesting approval from the diplomats based in Jerusalem.20 On the Turkish side, the
military had been a historical supporter of the cooperation, which it saw as a way to modernize its forces.
The 1996 agreement was, therefore, the result of the
military leadership in Ankara. It was also made possible because, on the civilian side, political parties had
started downgrading their usual anti-Israeli rhetoric
following the Oslo Process.
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In the next years, defense trade became a crucial
component of the bilateral relation. Israeli defense
industry modernized the Turkish fleet of F-4 Phantoms and its M-60 tanks. Ankara also started buying
various sophisticated weapons systems. All in all,
there was the feeling of a honeymoon between the
two countries. “For Jerusalem, the intimacy between
the two governments was second only to US-Israel
relations,”wrote Efraim Inbar, professor of political
studies at Bar-Ilan University.21
At that time, Israel-Greece relations also looked
promising with a military agreement signed in 1994.
It seemed for a short period of time as if the regional
mindset of a zero-sum game had vanished. However, 2 years later, after the agreement with Turkey had
been made public, when Foreign Minister Shimon Peres tried in vain to relaunch the perspective of defense
cooperation with the Greeks: Athens refused and political leaders started expressing their discontent concerning the Israeli-Turkish rapprochement.22 It was a
clear reminder that the zero-sum game still prevailed
in the East Mediterranean.
By the beginning of the 21st century, after nearly 5
decades, the East Mediterranean triangle seemed to be
reaching a new step. Although the Cypriot issue was
far from being solved, the tensions between Greece
and Turkey were lowering while the peace process in
the Middle East made a partnership with Israel possible. Political stability and economic prosperity were
in the air. But soon the new setting of the triangle established during the 1990s was to experience troubles
that would again lead to a reshuffling.
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THE UNRAVELLING OF THE TRIANGLE
By the end of 2001, with the second Intifada erupting, the election of Ariel Sharon in Israel and the 9/11
attacks in the United States had caused the hopes of a
peace process in the Middle East to all but disappear.
On November 3, 2002, the Justice and Development
Party (in Turkish dalet ve Kalkınma Partisi abbreviated
AKP) won the general elections in Turkey and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was nominated Prime Minister. Created only a year before the election, AKP was
in itself a revolution in Turkish politics. Although its
foundations were to be found in Islamism, it claimed to
be a center-right wing formation that would not challenge the country’s traditional secularism. Erdoğan’s
rhetoric combined conservatism and liberalism and
his followers presented themselves as “conservative
democrats.”23 Although the Israelis were initially worried that the AKP challenged the basis of the bilateral
relations, the new government in Ankara did not do
so in its first years. The military cooperation continued, the trade kept rising, and Erdoğan visited Israel
in May 2005. At the same time, Turkey was ambitiously redesigning its foreign policy under the supervision
of the chief advisor to Erdoğan, Ahmet Davutoğlu.
A former scholar, Davutoğlu had written a seminal
book Strategic Depth in 2001, which aimed to provide
a new roadmap for future Turkish governments. Using the German concept of lebensraum (literally “living
space”), he argued that Turkey’s geopolitical destiny
was to dominate a sphere of influence encompassing
the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus.24
In the following years, when Davutoğlu would become foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister, he
applied this theory to Turkey’s regional relations. Spe-
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cifically, Davutoğlu and Erdoğan believed in the idea
of a “zero-problem neighborhood policy” that would
allow the country to cultivate ties with all countries
in its vicinity without ideological limitations. In other words, Ankara would no longer constrain itself
by a dilemma between the West and the East, and it
would become the center of gravity, the junction of
the two worlds. Such a grand strategy was surely ambitious, but it negated the traditional logic of the zero-sum game in the Middle East, according to which
the Turkish-Israeli alliance had been built. Soon Jerusalem observed worryingly the consequences of the
new Turkish foreign policy as it started a process of
rapprochement with two hostile neighbors: Syria and
Iran.
Turkish-Iranian cooperation grew in earnest in
2004, when both countries signed an agreement on
security cooperation, with a particular emphasis on
counterterrorism, border security, and intelligence
sharing. Energy ties also expanded, as in July 2007,
Turkey and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding to transport 30 billion cubic meters of Iranian
and Turkmen natural gas to Europe. The deal foresaw
the construction of two separate pipelines to ship gas
from Iranian and Turkmen gas fields. Despite the
strong criticisms of the deal by the U.S. government,
the project is still active today.
Meanwhile, the Turkey-Syria reconciliation that developed all through the 2000s was epitomized in 2009
by a 3-day military maneuver involving ground forces
of both countries. It evidenced the new level of cooperation between Ankara and Damascus, confirmed a
month later by Turkish President Abdullah Gül’s visit
to Syria. The improvement of both bilateral relations
was to symbolize Davutoğlu’s principle of “zeroproblem neighborhood policy.”
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This new Turkish foreign policy was soon portrayed as a case of “neo-ottomanism.” Arabic newspapers widely portrayed Davutoğlu as the official
“architect of new ottomanism,”and in some cases
have been using false quotes in which Davutoğlu allegedly claimed to be a “neo-Ottoman.” Despite the
Turkish foreign minister’s public denial, this vision
persisted.25 This terminology of “new ottomans” or
“neo-ottomanism” blurred more than it enlightened
Turkish policies. It engendered many controversies
and misunderstandings for the observers of Turkish
politics that sometimes over exaggerated the Erdoğan
enterprise in the Middle East, as well as his means to
implement it.26
But what was Israel’s role in this scheme? In Davutoğlu’s original vision, the country was explicitly defined as an artificial creation, “a geopolitical tumour,”
and “a state that is politically foreign to that geography.”27 Although Jerusalem was expressing concerns,
the Turkish government also started engaging with
the Palestinian movement Hamas, considered a terrorist organization by Israel, by hosting a delegation
of their representatives in January 2006.
But in spite of this backdrop, the Turkish-Israeli
relation did not yet deteriorate. It is only by the end of
the 2000s that the AKP government started to demonstrate its discontent over the Israeli treatment of the
Palestinians. In particular, the IDF operation “Cast
Lead” targeting Hamas in the Gaza Strip which started
on December 27, 2008, provoked a rift that eventually
would tear the relation apart. Prime Minister Erdoğan
was said to take as an offense the fact that the Israeli
government neither shared information nor consulted him prior to the attack.28 Additionally, the scale of
the attack engendered a massive outrage in the Arab
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world, a phenomenon that the Turkish leader could
not ignore as he was working on improving Ankara’s
relations with Arab countries. After all, the zero-sum
game logic still existed.
This led to Erdoğan’s condemnation of Israel’s
“Cast Lead” operation during one of the plenary
sessions of the Davos Summit right in front of Israeli President Shimon Peres, on January 29, 2009. This
turned the Turkish Prime Minister into a hero in Arab
countries. In the following months, the more the Israel-Turkey tensions unraveled, the more positive Turkey's image became in the Arab world.29 In addition,
the rapprochement between Erdoğan’s Turkey and
Palestinian Hamas in Gaza, along with the preservation of close relations with the Palestinian National
Liberation Movement (Fatah), allowed Ankara to play
the role of mediator between Palestinian factions.30
Consequently, by the end of 2010, the debate in the
opinion pages of the leading Arabic newspapers was
not whether Turkey had new imperialistic ambitions,
but which similarities could be seen between Erdoğan and President Nasser, the Egyptian ruler and
perennial figure of Arab nationalism.31
On the Israeli front, the first consequences were felt
in the decrease of high-level visits and the inflation
of anti-Israeli rhetoric in Turkish politics. Events unfolded as a series of escalating accidents. In September
2009, while traveling to Israel, Ahmet Davutoğlu, by
then Foreign Minister, was refused access to the Gaza
Strip by Israeli authorities. In reaction, Turkey canceled the participation of the Israeli Air Force to the
military exercise “Anatolian Eagle” in October of the
same year. The year 2010 deepened the bilateral crisis.
Military exchanges were significantly diminished, and
in the spring, Israeli officials publicly expressed con-
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cerns over the nomination of Hakan Fidan as Head of
Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization. A close
friend of Erdoğan, Fidan was seen as a pro-Iranian figure by the Israelis. According to that view, his alleged
agenda would compromise intelligence exchanges
with Tel Aviv.32 Several officials from the Ministry of
Defense in Tel Aviv described Fidan to us as “the man
of Tehran in Ankara.”33 “He is the person who sold
Israel’s secrets to the Iranians,” Israeli intelligence
officials said of Fidan to the newspaper Haaretz.34
Later on, the Israelis also believed that Fidan played
an instrumental role in a clash that has left scars on
the Turkish-Israeli relations to this day: the Mavi
Marmara incident.
The Mavi Marmara was a passenger ship bought
by the Turkish non-governmental organization (NGO)
Humanitarian Relief Foundation in 2010 which intended to defy the Israeli blockade over Gaza in May
2010. While in international waters, the “freedom flotilla” composed of six ships was asked by Israeli Naval Forces to divert its trajectory to Ashdod Port, but
the flotilla declined and was boarded in international
waters. Activists and Israeli commandos engaged in a
violent clash that led to the death of nine NGO members and the injuring of 10 Israeli soldiers. Although
a cloud of controversy surrounded the action of the
Mavi Marmara flotilla, Israel argued that the IDF intervention was legal in that the ship was not containing any humanitarian aid. This triggered an uproar
in public opinion all around the world. Eventually,
it became the point of no return between Turkey and
Israel, or at least according to the perceptions of diplomats on both sides. Starting in the following weeks,
political dialogue between both countries ceased with
Israel’s government refusing to apologize for the clash
over the Turkish flotilla, and the authorities of Tur19

key blocking not only bilateral cooperation but Israel-NATO cooperation as well, as we will see later in
the monograph.
Then in early-2013, after 3 years of deterioration,
Israeli diplomats were hoping to restore the ties: several high-level meetings had taken place, including
the heads of intelligence in Cairo. In a carefully theatrical phone call, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu conveyed his apologies to Erdoğan over the
loss of lives in the Mavi Marmara raid. The Turkish
leader accepted them, and an initial agreement was
reached on compensation. Expectations were high in
Jerusalem, and observers believed that Turkey was by
now revamping its Middle Eastern policy against the
backdrop of the Syrian crisis. Indeed, supporting the
revolution against the Syrian ruler, Turkey’s assertiveness was progressively seen as an ill-advised and
perilous escalation of the conflict. In particular, Turkey’s support for the rebels, including fringes among
them that were identified as extremist factions (e.g.
Jabhat al-Nusra) led many to wonder what exactly the
objective driving Ankara’s policy was in the Syrian
civil war.35
Notwithstanding this small window of opportunity, the relation between Ankara and Jerusalem got
worse, not better. In the summer of 2013, Erdoğan accused Israel of being involved in the military coup that
ousted former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi.
Despite the implementation of compensation by the Israelis, the Turkish leadership kept repeating its strong
aversion for Israel and Zionism which the Prime Minister even described as a “crime against humanity.”36
By the first months of 2015, when we returned to Tel
Aviv and Jerusalem for a new series of interviews, our
interlocutors were no longer expecting anything. A
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consensus had emerged within the military and the
diplomatic corps that Turkey, at least under the reign
of the AKP, was not interested in restoring ties with
Israel. The rift was not only affecting the level of political leadership, but the working level of diplomats and
officers who were exchanging only on an ad hoc,
informal basis. Arms sales were slowing down, and
progressively fears of anti-Semitic attitudes in Turkey were leading Israeli tourists to avoid Turkey as a
destination. If in 2013 government insiders were still
optimistic, they had completely become disillusioned
2 years later. It is in this specific context that IsraelGreece relations have been improved.
It all started through military exchanges. Between
May 28 to June 12, 2008, an exercise between the
two national air forces called Glorious Spartan took
place. It conveyed the first signal that the long dormant military agreement between both countries—the
agreement that had been signed a decade earlier but
which never got implemented—could after all be active. A year later, the relation upgraded to the political
echelon. A meeting was held on October 15, 2009, in
Athens between Greek and Israeli political insiders.
They discussed the opportunity of strengthening the
bilateral ties. The participants included advisors close
to George Papandreou, who had been elected Greek
Prime Minister a week earlier, and the gathering was
called, according to Aristotle Tziampiris, “the Electra group” in reference to the Electra Hotel in Athens
where discussions took place.37 This informal network
of like-minded advisors promoted the rapprochement
to their respective leaders.
A new step was reached in February 2010 when
Papandreou and Netanyahu met in Moscow. Both
heads of government happened to be visiting Russia
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at the same time, so a meeting was shortly arranged
at Moscow’s Cafe Pushkin on February 16, 2010, during which the two prime ministers discussed rather
openly about their foreign policy challenges.38 The
Cafe Pushkin meeting would be the starting point of
an intense exchange between the two governments. It
was then followed by various official high-level visits
at the level of presidents, prime ministers, and defense
ministers. In July 2010, Papandreou visited Jerusalem,
and Netanyahu traveled to Athens only a month later.
As a result, a new cooperation memorandum was
signed. It widely expanded previous documents as
various fields of common interest were now on the
table: security exchanges, tourism, and energy projects. The following year, Israel Defense Minister Ehud
Barak and his Greek counterpart, Panos Beglitis, went
further by passing a security cooperation agreement.
Meanwhile, the Greek parliament approved the purchase of Israeli bomb-precision upgrade kits, which
cost $155 million for 400 systems.
Between 2010 and 2012, no less than 13 joint GreekIsraeli military exercises had been conducted: among
others, Minoas, Caya Green, Aegean Seal, Noble Dina,
Passex, and Turning Point.39
The Israel-Greece rapprochement is not only visible in the military realm but also in other sectors such
as tourism, culture, education and trade. Prior to the
Papandreou visit of 2010, there were around 150,000
Israeli tourists coming to Greece each year. For 2012,
they were estimated to reach 400,000.
Witnessing the rise of the bilateral relation, Greek
President Karolos Papoulis visited Israel on July 10,
2011. During one interview there, he expressed his
view on this recent rapprochement:
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Greece and Israel have rich and diverse ties. . . . Our
Ministers and officials systematically consult and
work together on all levels and in key areas: energy,
defense and security, agriculture, tourism. . . . We
are pursuing a strong relationship—strong on trade,
strong on investment, strong on political, and security
cooperation.40

On the other side, Israel also conveyed the message that the relation had never been so high. Israeli
Ambassador to Greece, Aryeh Mekel, explained to the
online media, Al-Monitor:
Greek-Israel relations today are at an unprecedented
peak. In the last three years, the relationship has undergone a dramatic changeover due to the decision of
the two countries to open a new page and maintain
long-term strategic cooperation without connection to
relations with other countries.41

The last specification from Mekel is worth underlining and challenging: is this rapprochement really without any connection to relations with other
countries?
True, the Israelis and the Greeks emphasize that
cooperation did not come out of the blue in 2010, that
the first bilateral economic agreement was written in
1992, and the first military agreement in 1994 — in fact
before the one between Israel and Turkey.
Still, the timing of the rapprochement coincides a
bit too much with the widening gap between Israel
and Turkey. This is why Turkish leaders have been
obviously scrutinizing these developments. Military
exercises engendered low-level tensions in the Mediterranean when, at times, the Turkish Navy would
conduct maneuvers near Cyprus at the same time as
the joint Israeli-Greek exercises.42 However, off the
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record, Turkish officials tend to dismiss their concerns, downplaying the strategic significance of this
Israeli-Greek rapprochement. One diplomat sarcastically told us, “If Israel wants to counterbalance Turkey with a country in profound economic and political troubles like Greece, we [the Turks] should not be
worried, the Israelis should!”43
Israeli officers and diplomats do not hide this strategic fact: Greece is no substitute for Turkey. It has
neither the geopolitical reach nor the military might
of the historical ally of Israel. Not only is Greece enduring a financial crisis that is eroding its military
capabilities, but it never had the type of leverage Turkey enjoys in the Middle East and that Israel crucially
needs today. But as one diplomat formerly assigned
in Ankara states, “Greece allows us to avoid complete
isolation in the Mediterranean. Look at the current
state of our neighbors: Syria, Lebanon, Egypt. Desperate times call for desperate measures.”44
If the rapprochement with Greece does not exactly
look like Israel countering Turkey, it could, at least, be
depicted as a hedge against Turkish diplomatic reorientation. Still, the persistent view in the region is that
the logic behind the honeymoon between Jerusalem
and Athens is “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
This is not without embarrassment for the Greeks and
the Israelis who want to see more than bitter politics
in the rapprochement. In fact, it is in the interest of
neither Greece nor Israel to confine their rapprochement to a move to counterbalance Turkey.
Athens is not keen on using its Israeli policy to antagonize Ankara as recent Greek prime ministers have
committed their country to the enhancement of the relationship with its historical rival, in particular in the
field of bilateral trade.
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As a result, the East Mediterranean Triangle can
now be characterized as a volatile regional system in
which alliances are no longer stable blocs. This is reflected in the ambivalent games played by the three
main actors. Each of them is trying to seek seemingly
contradictory goals: Israel wants to restore its ties
with Turkey while hedging against Ankara’s policies via a rapprochement with Greece; Greece aims to
strengthen its military and commercial relations with
Israel, but without openly defying Turkey; Turkey
still benefits from Israeli military know-how but expresses strong condemnations of the Netanyahu government, and moreover, it dismisses the Israeli-Greek
rapprochement while it uses its navy in the Mediterranean area as a means of coercive diplomacy against
competing forces. All of this generates an odd zerosum game: every stakeholder claims the rules of this
game still apply but bypasses them.
This volatility is exacerbated by the deep personalization of the relations between the three countries.
There is a widely shared view in Israel and Turkey
that the low level of cooperation between the two governments is first and foremost a result of the difficult
relation between their leaders, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
and Benjamin Netanyahu. However, on the other
hand, it could be argued that historically, given the
huge sensitivity of the matter, Turkish-Israeli cooperation was only made possible because of decisions at
the highest level. Personal relations between leaders
always mattered: after all, one reason Ben-Gurion was
supportive of a partnership with Turkey was because
he had lived in Istanbul and was a great admirer of
the first president of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.
Moreover, the Arab factor that played a role over
the last years is nothing new. We have seen that the
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Suez War, or later Nasser’s pressures on Ankara, affected the Israeli-Turkish relation. In a sense, the 1990s
made observers forget the importance of the Arab factor because of the optimism borne out of the Oslo Process and the momentum it engendered in the region.
Regarding Greece, there was important apprehension in Israel regarding the electoral victory of the
Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) party in January
2015, which led Alexis Tsipras to become the Prime
Minister. Israeli diplomats feared that the left-wing
platform conducted by Tsipras would not see the
rapprochement with Israel as a priority or even as a
valuable asset. But paradoxically, over the last 5 years,
Greek governments have been more unstable than
those of Turkey and Israel, but they have shown continuity on the issue of relations with Jerusalem, something that Aristotle Tziampiris describes as a kind of
“papandreouism without Papandreou.”45
Eventually, the volatility of the triangle makes the
future of the East Mediterranean region hardly predictable, in particular because it will primarily depend
on the domestic politics of the three countries.
THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE CURRENT
CRISIS
Having portrayed the history and the current state
of the strategic triangle, we can now look at three domains in which its evolution will have important consequences: the rising power plays in the Mediterranean regarding the discovery of significant gas reserves;
the consequences of the tensions between Turkey and
Israel on NATO policies; and the changing foreign
policy of Israel vis-à-vis these developments within
Europe.
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Since late-2011, the rapprochement between Jerusalem and Athens is not only driven by military goals,
but also by economic prospects borne out of the discovery of natural gas reserves in the East Mediterranean. A geological study in 2010 showed that the Levantine area could hold as much as 122 trillion cubic
feet of recoverable gas.46 So far, Israeli companies have
been the most advanced in preparing to extract gas
from its exclusive economic zones. There, a consortium led by the American firm Noble Energy, composed
of Israeli firms Delek and Avner Oil, have worked on
the resources of two major gas fields, Leviathan and
Tamar. Initially there were also high speculations regarding the gas field Aphrodite in Cyprus’s exclusive
economic zone, but as of 2015, exploration proved less
promising than expected.47
Still the discovery of these reserves has generated a
new area of cooperation between Greece, Cyprus, and
Israel in terms of gas export projects. Israeli companies like Noble and Delek have been working closely
with Greece and Cyprus in the extraction of other energy supplies. The project involves Israel and Cyprus
creating a gas pipeline, and an LNG terminal with the
gas being brought from there to Europe via Greece.48
This option could be an attractive one for European
countries eager to find an alternative to the Gazprom
supply if relations with Russia worsen—one-third of
European imports come from Russia as of 2015. As a
result, Israeli Energy Minister Uzi Landau stated in
2012 with rather optimism:
in the Middle East, that is now caught in a tremendous
earthquake, stretching from the Atlantic to the Persian
Gulf and beyond, the axis of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel will provide an anchor of stability—and stability
is highly important.49
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Because it was assumed this energy bonanza
would redraw the economic map of the region, it has
been perceived as a major game changer. For Israel,
it will secure sufficient production for its domestic
needs, and it could represent a high opportunity for
exports to Europe. For Greece and Cyprus, the export
project may strengthen their geopolitical position
within the European Union (EU) and provide them
with precious economic prospects in the middle of a
protracted financial crisis.
But the project is not without major uncertainties.
Given its complexity, its cost is estimated at 10 billion euros (U.S.$11 billion) which would include the
extraction and the transportation to Europe.50 Once
the final investment decision to award the project is
made, experts evaluate that it will take about 6 to 7
years to complete. “It is technically challenging and
because of that it might be financially challenging”
summed up Guy Feldman, advisor to Silvan Shalom,
Israeli Energy Minister.51 To address the issue of costs,
Israel, Greece and Cyprus have been trying to make
the case to the European Commission in Brussels to attract funding. So far it has been qualified by the EU as
a “project of common interest.” This status was given
by the European Commission to a list of 248 projects
which can access a 5.85 billion euros fund from the
initiative Connecting Europe Facility between now
and 2020. In 2015, the Greek company IGI Poseidon
received 2 million euros for preliminary studies.52 Although this indicates an interest from the EU for the
project, political leaders in European capitals have
been sensitive to the security and diplomatic issues
that surround it.
Channeling energy supplies in regions like the
Middle East has always been a major safety issue for
investors. In this particular case, the Israeli military
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establishment expressed its apprehension regarding
the project. Locating export facilities outside Israeli
territory is considered a liability by the military, and
it was recommended in a special investigation led
by the Tzemach committee that the infrastructure be
placed under Israeli sovereignty.53 Moreover, for the
last 2 years, the Israeli Navy has pushed for a supplementary budget of $820 million as it estimates it will
need four new vessels and manpower to secure the
facilities. So far the Israeli government did not accede
to this claim.54
Security analysts have already speculated that Islamic militias like Hamas or Hezbollah may be tempted to target Israeli off-shore facilities.55 Given the
advanced quality of their missile arsenal (range and
accuracy), this definitely plays a role in the Israeli calculus. Back in 2006, in the middle of the summer war
between Israel and Hezbollah, the planners in Tel Aviv
were taken by surprise when the Party of God used a
Chinese-made, Iranian-upgraded C-802 radar-guided
missile against an Israeli missile boat patrolling off the
Lebanese coast. If a new conflict in Gaza or Lebanon
was to occur, it is likely that offshore facilities like gas
fields would be valuable targets. This factor raises the
security cost of the project to a level that is not easily
measurable.
But the project also faces challenges on the diplomatic front. This Israel-Greece-Cyprus initiative
has logically triggered strong opposition from Turkey, which does not recognize the government in
Nicosia and objects to the claims of the Greek Cypriot Administration over the gas reserves in the
south of the island. Ankara responded by conducting air and sea military drills close to the area of the
planned project. In August 2011, Foreign Minister
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Davutoğlu threatened that Turkey would “show the
proper reaction” if the three countries were to go on
with the project.56 A later statement from the Turkish
Foreign Ministry elaborated on Ankara’s claims:
International law dictates that the delimitation of the
continental shelf or the exclusive economic zone in
the eastern Mediterranean, which is indeed a semienclosed sea, should be effected between the relevant
states in an equitable manner . . . The Greek Cypriot
Administration does not represent in law or in fact the
Turkish Cypriots and Cyprus as a whole. . . . These
unlawful acts create tension in the region, compromise and prejudge the Turkish Cypriots’ existing and
inherent equal rights over the natural resources of the
island.57

Turkey has its own ambitions as an energy hub
for Europe through the Southern Gas Corridor. Since
the failure of the Nabucco project, Turkey signed a
memorandum of understanding with Azerbaijan on
the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline, which could provide
Europe with natural gas supplies.
However, competition between Turkey, Greece, Israel and Cyprus is not unavoidable. If the Greek-Cypriot-Israeli project were to include Turkey, it could
become a more reliable option, both economically and
politically. In terms of feasibility, a pipeline reaching
Turkey from Israel would represent half the distance
of the Cyprus-Israel option. Engineers estimate that
it could cost around $2 billion, which appears much
more attractive than the $11 billion for the first project.58 Politically, it would lower the risks of regional
tensions as it removes the Greek-Turkish dispute over
Cyprus from the equation. But this assumes leadership in both Turkey and Israel to settle their dispute.
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Despite the commercial incentives, it appears today
that the gas conundrum will only be solved by a restoration of bilateral ties at the political level.
Furthermore, it has appeared in the last 2 years that
the Israeli-Cypriot natural gas project might not be
so promising economically: the decrease of oil prices
harmed the world gas markets and, in the longer term,
the new discovery in Egypt of possibly the “largest
ever” offshore natural gas field could well lower the
export prospects for Israel and Cyprus.59
The gas fields of the Mediterranean are not the only
issue suffering from the tensions in the regional triangle. Another, less-documented issue is the way Turkish-Israeli disputes affect NATO’s partnership policy
in the Middle East. Turkish diplomats at the NATO
Headquarters in Brussels have been playing a game
of exporting their issues with Israel to the Transatlantic Alliance. After the Mavi Marmara crisis, blocking
the cooperation activities between NATO and Israel,
a country member of the Mediterranean Dialogue,60
became a strategy used by Ankara—through NATO’s
consensus rule—to isolate Jerusalem.
In 2011 the announcement of the coming deployment of U.S. radar in Turkey—as part of NATO’s missile defense project—led to a deep controversy over
the issue of the information gathered by the radar and
the possibility that this data could be shared with Israel. In practice, information coming from a U.S. radar
is fused with data and U.S. intelligence assessments
which is shared with allies, including Israel, according
to the policy decided in Washington. This quickly became an issue of domestic politics in Ankara with the
opposition accusing the government of hosting a military system to defend Israel. Davutoğlu and Erdoğan
repeatedly underlined that the purpose of the radar
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was to protect Turkey and dismissed the likelihood of
sharing data with Israel.61
In 2012, Turkish foreign minister Davutoğlu stated
publicly that Israel would not be allowed to attend the
NATO Summit taking place in Chicago in May of that
year. A senior Turkish official interviewed by the daily newspaper Hurriyet explained:
There will be no Israeli presence at the NATO meeting unless they issue a formal apology and pay compensation for the Turkish citizens their commandos
killed in international waters . . . These are demands
from us for the removal of our veto, but this is out of
question . . . Those countries who wish to see normalization in ties between Turkey and Israel should advise Israel to apologize and to compensate the killing
of Turks in international waters.62

In September of the same year, the U.S. government through its ambassador to Ankara, Francis Ricciardone, persuaded the Turks not to cancel the NATO
Minotaur exercise because of Israeli presence. In an
email that was later leaked to the press, Ricciardone
conveyed the message that the Israelis would not be
active participants:
what we have from our Israeli friends is that, if the
NATO Minotaur exercise happens, IDF would limit
their participation ‘observers.’ Thus there would be
scant chance of IDF + TU forces being credibly accused
of ‘exercising’ together: The Israelis will be observing,
not exercising nor ‘participating,’ in the active sense of
the other NATO + partner forces.63

There are many other cases where U.S. influence
did not succeed. Turkey blocked Israel’s participation
in the NATO operation “Active Endeavor” in the Med-
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iterranean Sea, although the operation has included
ships from partner countries since 2004, and despite
the fact that NATO and Israel had already signed an
agreement in 2010 that was supposed to lead to participation in the operation.64 Likewise, to enhance its
relations with partners, NATO has allowed them to
appoint an official representative to the Alliance with
his (or her) own office, but again, Turkey prevented
Israel’s attempt to send someone.65
As a result, NATO’s Middle East partnership initiative, the Mediterranean Dialogue, has been in a
deadlock for years. True, the dialogue was modest in
its scope from the outset but because it included Israel, Turkey used its veto power at the North Atlantic
Council to block activities that would have involved
the Hebrew State. As a consequence, NATO political officers have a rather bitter view on that situation:
“NATO’s partnership in the Middle East has been
hijacked by the tensions between one member and a
partner country.”66 On the other side, Israeli officials
expressed frustration over the systematic blockage
of cooperation with the Alliance. “This is a difficult
process and that only reinforces the common view in
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv that we can’t rely on Western
cooperation, we are on our own.”67
This leads us to the third major consequence of the
new dynamics within the East Mediterranean Triangle: the increasing distance between Israel and Western allies. The rapprochement between Jerusalem and
Athens is only one piece of the puzzle to understand
Israel’s contemporary foreign policy, and it has to be
correlated with the ties that the country has been developing at the same time with countries as diverse as
Azerbaijan and India. As written earlier, Israel’s relation with Greece follows the logic of hedging, rather
than countering, the Turkish opposition. Moreover,
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it evidences the diversification of Israeli diplomatic
partners beyond its historical allies.
For instance, the Indian-Israeli rapprochement has
been in the making for more than two decades. Since
establishing diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992,
India has relied on it as a key arms supplier, second
only to Russia. Military-to-military relations became
closer, particularly in the area of counterterrorism following the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Indian armed forces
at that time expressed growing interest in Israeli counterterrorism techniques, which led to the establishment of joint working groups and military exercises.68
With regard to Azerbaijan, Israel is now among
the country’s top five commercial partners. In the energy sector, Baku provides around 40% of Israel’s oil
consumption. In 2012, Azerbaijan and Israel signed
an arms supply agreement worth $1.6 billion, which
included Israel selling drones and missile defense
systems to Azerbaijan. This rapprochement riled,
not surprisingly, Azerbaijan’s neighbor, Iran, which
strongly condemned Baku’s decision.69 Azerbaijan
surely has an interest in hedging against Iran, as the
regime in Tehran remains a key ally of Armenia. In the
1990s, Iran supported the Armenians during the war
over Nagorno-Karabakh, one of its motives being the
presence of a significant community of ethnic Azeris
in Iran. Against that backdrop, Israel is a convenient
partner for Azerbaijan, conveying a message of resolve to Tehran. In addition, Israeli weapons systems
are valuable in the context of the U.S. and EU embargo
on arms sales to Azerbaijan. The leadership in Baku,
however, is unlikely to cross the threshold of a full
alliance for fear of Tehran’s reaction. Reflecting this
caution, Baku has not opened an embassy in Israel,
and it voted at the UN General Assembly in favor of
granting observer status to Palestine.70
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At first glance, these bilateral relations may appear
disconnected as the Greeks, Azerbaijanis, Indians,
and Gulf Cooperation Council members hardly share
commonalities in their strategic agendas. If however,
one follows the logic of the periphery doctrine from
the 1950s, these ties could be interpreted as parts of
a broader strategy revamping the principles formulated by Ben-Gurion back then. With Iran emerging as
the primary threat in the eyes of Israeli planners and
Turkey scuttling their bilateral partnership, Israel had
to revise its diplomatic orientation and craft a new
“periphery.”
First, all these new ties, including those with
Greece, are understood to be diplomatic scenery rather than fundamental strategic moves. In other words,
they allow Israel to avoid isolation, but they do not
reassure the country against potential threats. Second,
if the historical “periphery” was implemented by BenGurion in close coordination with the American ally,
this new one looks more like a reaction to a feeling of
strategic loneliness by Israeli planners. The unraveling of Israel-Turkey relations coincided with the socalled Arab Spring that led to a protracted crisis in
Egypt, an intensified conflict in Syria, and the weakening of Jordan, its last Arab partner standing. In addition, as viewed from Jerusalem, the global landscape
looks gloomy with the seeming lack of resolve of the
Barack Obama administration vis-à-vis Tehran, and
the perceived rise of anti-Israeli sentiments in Europe.
For these reasons, the resurrection of the periphery
doctrine does not constitute a new grand strategy for
Israel, but epitomizes Israel’s current foreign policy
predicaments. This look-east policy of Israel matters
because eventually it affects the ability of the United
States to shape the game in the Mediterranean region.
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All in all, the diplomatic, security, and economic ramifications of the evolving triangle call for a carefully
calibrated U.S. regional policy.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
The volatility of the Eastern-Mediterranean region,
fueled by the evolving power plays between Israel,
Greece, Turkey, and to a lesser extent, Cyprus matters
to the United States for several reasons. As we demonstrated, the competition affects the security arrangements in Europe, with NATO’s Middle East partnership being in a deadlock. The natural gas projects
brought about disputes over the territorial claims in
the area and in the coming years, without a diplomatic settlement, it could lead to rising naval skirmishes
with gunboat diplomacy becoming a norm similar to
the practices witnessed in the South China Sea.
In addition to these internal factors, the EasternMediterranean security environment will be shaped by
the evolution of crises in its vicinity. On the one hand,
Turkey faces increasing security demands as the Syrian conflict spreads along its territory. It exacerbates
both, the stand-off with Kurdish forces and the threat
of Islamic terrorism as demonstrated by the bombing
attack in Ankara in October 2015. Furthermore, the
Russian air campaign in Syria, starting in September
2015, led to skirmishes with the Turkish military as
Russian planes and drones strayed into Turkish airspace. On the other hand, the Iranian nuclear deal adopted in 2015 amplifies the level of anxiety in Israel’s
defense community. As a result, the U.S. government
has been conveying a message of solidarity and reassurance through closer military cooperation with
Israeli forces.
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To prevent instability, the U.S. has to navigate between the concerns and the sensitivity of three allies.
The key will be to find the right balance between reassuring one ally without antagonizing the other. The
Turks have perceived U.S. pressures against Ankara
in the NATO arena vis-à-vis partnership with Israel
as an unfair treatment. Turkish diplomats frequently
complain that the United States should give priority to the interests of a NATO ally, and not to those
of a mere partner like Israel. On the other hand, the
Israelis sometimes feel like the Americans are cajoling the Turkish government to avoid Erdoğan’s game
of brinkmanship, and, since late-2014, to get Turkey
to participate in the U.S.-led coalition against ISIL
in Syria. In an article explicitly titled “Turkey is no
American Ally,” Efraim Inbar from Bar-Ilan University expresses strong criticisms which constitute a fair
account of views in Tel Aviv:
Turkey is officially a NATO ally, and President Barrack Obama has called the current President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a friend. But Erdogan-led
Turkey does not behave as an ally or a friend of the US
… It is not clear why Washington puts up with such
Turkish behavior. The Obama administration seems to
be unable to call a spade a spade. It refuses to acknowledge that Turkey is a Trojan horse in NATO, and that
Ankara undermines American interests in the Middle
East and elsewhere.71

It is doubtful that a regional approach to U.S.
policy in the East Mediterranean would succeed. In
fact, the zero-sum game logic is so ingrained in the
decisionmaking process of the three local players—
Greece, Israel, and Turkey—that a regional approach
is likely to stumble.
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The core issue of the current troubles in the East
Mediterranean Triangle is the crisis in the Turkish-Israeli relations. As a result, the first measure to prevent
further escalation in this rift is to disconnect the Turkish-Israeli file from the Greek and Cypriot cases. U.S.
diplomats and officers should carefully dismiss the
counterbalancing narrative behind the Israeli-Greek
rapprochement. Although increasing ties between
Athens and Jerusalem in trade, tourism, or maritime
security are welcomed, trilateral military exercises
should avoid conveying any offensive message to the
Turkish authorities. The United States could make
sure that drills like Noble Dina will not be perceived
as a means to intimidate Ankara. This implies choosing the scenario of the exercise prudently and coupling these initiatives with diplomatic reassurances to
Turkey. Given the intricacies of the competition in the
East Mediterranean, it is necessary to avoid misperceptions and miscalculations.
Following the same logic of prevention, the U.S.
administration may address the NATO issue by making the case that the Alliance’s partnership policy
should not be undermined by the tensions between
one member nation and a partner country. It does not
mean challenging or ignoring Turkish political agenda; this would only bring further obstruction from Ankara. However, the scope of NATO-Israel partnership
is by nature modest and should not be the issue of a
fierce diplomatic fight. For instance, activities involving military education and training should not suffer
from the crisis. A distinct line can be drawn between
military operational activities with no strategic implications and political-military initiatives with high visibility. Under the current circumstances, it would not
be realistic to expect Turkey to allow strategic coop-
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eration with Israel within the Alliance. Topics such as
missile defense cooperation or intelligence exchanges
are unlikely to be discussed in the Alliance as long as
the bilateral dispute is not solved. Admittedly, for the
NATO officers in Brussels, this situation is hardly a
desirable end-state.
This is why a second step would look at the ways
to reinitiate political and diplomatic dialogue between
Israel and Turkey. The United States could act as a
mediator by convening working-level meetings to discuss common areas of interest. Objectively both countries have a mutual interest in cooperating over the
Syrian crisis and its effects on the region. They both
suffer from the spill-over effect of the conflict and are
likely to be targets of terrorist organizations operating
from the Syrian territory. To make it work, these talks
should involve diplomats and policy advisors but not
yet politicians. Back in 2013, the general assumption
was that the crisis would be solved first at the highest
level. This led to the very public apology of Netanyahu to Erdoğan for the Mavi Marmara incident. But as
testified by the officials we interviewed for this study,
the level of distrust and enmity between the heads of
government of both countries is such that a bottom-up
approach has more chances to succeed. The time will
be ripe for the political leaders to step in only when
the working-level exchanges have created an environment of confidence. The major uncertainty regarding
this phase is obviously its duration: although a hasty
approach certainly leads to failure, endless talks between experts are not likely to achieve gains either.
This is why the U.S. diplomatic apparatus would have
to seize the moment and to pressure, when necessary,
the stakeholders to move to the next level, keeping in
mind obviously the electoral calendar in both countries. True, it may look like a mission with remote
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chances of success, but after all, the 1958 rapprochement between Turkey and Israel was by all accounts
more unlikely to occur than one today. If one lesson
has to be learned from the history of the East Mediterranean, it is that the seemingly perpetual freezing
of relations can swiftly stop if national leaders revise
their strategic priorities in light of new events.
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